properly run and there needed to be properly run and managed an effective meeting to get on top of this terrible crisis. lilo; on top of this terrible crisis. no, it wasn't about _ on top of this terrible crisis. iifrl, it wasn't about process, it on top of this terrible crisis. iifr, it wasn't about process, it was about making sure that decisions taken were taken with the right input. as you see, i had completely forgotten i had written this e—mail, but it expresses pretty pungently my view of our collective government. was it in your mind when you've recommended this change of machinery of the government to the prime minister that the devolved administrations could play a proper role in the crisis response and engage with the united kingdom government at these meetings, or at least part of some of these meetings?— least part of some of these meetinus? ., ., , ., , ., meetings? that was a very important to me. meetings? that was a very important to me- one — meetings? that was a very important to me- one of _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things i _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things i made - meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things i made a . to me. one of the things i made a priority of cabinet secretary was

strong relationships, institutional and personal with the devolved administrations and spent time with each of theirfirst administrations and spent time with each of their first ministers, told them i was there cabinet secretary as well. they should think of me and supporting them as well. i wanted to make sure that the devolved administrations, recognising the different districts, the more collaboration the better. the devolved administrations were invited to attend the groups. was that a writer an invitation? it would be an invitation. cabinet committees do not normally involve devolved administrations for obvious reasons. they weren't included routinely in the international one because that is entirely preserved, but they were asked to join the

others. and the expectation was that they were included. it wasn'tjust they were included. it wasn'tjust they would be invited ad hoc, they were part of that process. that was very much the intention. find were part of that process. that was very much the intention.— very much the intention. and after the 30th of — very much the intention. and after the 30th of march, _ very much the intention. and after the 30th of march, cobra - very much the intention. and after the 30th of march, cobra still- the 30th of march, cobra still continued to convene, therefore may we presume that the devolved administrations continue to attend cobra thereafter?— cobra thereafter? indeed, by then cobra thereafter? indeed, by then cobra was taking _ cobra thereafter? indeed, by then cobra was taking place _ cobra thereafter? indeed, by then cobra was taking place and - cobra thereafter? indeed, by theni cobra was taking place and hosted from the cabinet room usually on teams in devolved administrations would routinely go there. in fact the shot and we have used for it is cobra but if you look at the minute, we called it the seat 19 ministerial, and we essentially created the cabinet committee structure around it. —— yes, it was

one of his ministerial responsibilities and he had also developed political relationships with the devolved administrations and so that was something he took on. ., and so that was something he took on, ., , ., and so that was something he took on. ., ,, ., on. your statement recognises that there were — on. your statement recognises that there were occasional— on. your statement recognises that there were occasional frictions - on. your statement recognises that there were occasional frictions in i there were occasional frictions in there were occasional frictions in the relationship between united kingdom government and the devolved administrations. to firstly to the structures and styles of governance within the united kingdom, and secondly, what you described us differing perspectives of the individual devolved administrations. what is he inquiry to make of that degree of tension, ultimately did the united kingdom and the devolved administration speak from a relatively uniform position? were

they were broadly in alignment? how much did that degree of tension or friction matter? i much did that degree of tension or friction matter?— friction matter? i think in the face ofthe friction matter? i think in the face of the crisis. _ friction matter? i think in the face of the crisis, that _ friction matter? i think in the face of the crisis, that alignment - friction matter? i think in the face of the crisis, that alignment was i of the crisis, that alignment was striking. it became paradoxically more difficult later when the difficulty of the decisions was considerably less acute than it was at that face going into the first lockdown. and the point i was making both of these were rival political parties, a conservative government in london, labour administration in cardiff, scottish nationalists in edinburgh and the coalition in northern ireland with very different perspectives and as i knew from my own experience with very different personal governance dialled by the first ministers. so i think in that phase of it —— personal governance styles. i think in that crazy

alignment was striking. it became high friction later.— high friction later. there were obviously _ high friction later. there were obviously a — high friction later. there were obviously a wide _ high friction later. there were obviously a wide range - high friction later. there were obviously a wide range of- high friction later. there were - obviously a wide range of decisions that the united kingdom government had to take, ranging from the decision to impose a first national lockdown, but also in the week beforehand a decision about the closure of schools, the social restrictions short of a lockdown. and there were also issues about public communications. the evidence appears to indicate that there were particular frictions revolving around public communications because of course united kingdom prime minister when he addresses the nation is bound to have an impact on all parts of the nation. and secondly, there was an issue about the closure of schools because of cost schooling if a devolved matter. but in relation to the heart of the decision—making that the government had to engage in, the lockdown

decision, was there any significant orany decision, was there any significant or any degree of divergence? i don't recall any degree — or any degree of divergence? i don't recall any degree of _ or any degree of divergence? i don't recall any degree of divergence. - or any degree of divergence? i don't recall any degree of divergence. i i recall any degree of divergence. i think the point to make about communications in schools are correct. it is worth just recalling that we didn't call it lockdown at that we didn't call it lockdown at that time. what we have now come to know us lockdown essentially came in two tranches, one on the 16th of march which was largely voluntary and advisory about isolation, social distancing, working from home, and then subsequently the full stay—at—home message which we then came to know as lockdown about a week later. on the devolved administrations and government in london essentially old moved in lockstep throughout those two decisions. , , . . lockstep throughout those two decisions. , , ., ., ., decisions. the inquiry is aware that on the 23rd — decisions. the inquiry is aware that

on the 23rd march, _ decisions. the inquiry is aware that on the 23rd march, that _ decisions. the inquiry is aware that on the 23rd march, that was - decisions. the inquiry is aware that on the 23rd march, that was a - on the 23rd march, that was a decision requesting the country to stay at home but it was of course backed by the force of law. indeed. that is why it is a lockdown decision. that is why it is a lockdown decision-— that is why it is a lockdown decision. , ~ ., decision. exactly. alli am saying is that i don't _ decision. exactly. alli am saying is that i don't think _ decision. exactly. alli am saying is that i don't think at _ decision. exactly. alli am saying is that i don't think at the - decision. exactly. alli am saying is that i don't think at the time, | is that i don't think at the time, if you look at the papers at the time, we didn't use a word lockdown until afterwards when all of these have come together.— until afterwards when all of these have come together. indeed. without auoin into have come together. indeed. without going into the — have come together. indeed. without going into the detail— have come together. indeed. without going into the detail of— have come together. indeed. without going into the detail of the _ have come together. indeed. without going into the detail of the change . going into the detail of the change in strategy, the evidence shows there was an emerging understanding that their mitigation strategy would lead to the nhs being overwhelmed and an emerging understanding that the squashing of the sombrero, and an attempt to delay the peak would lead the country into the abyss and it was necessary to apply much harsher, more stringent suppression measures to really get on top of it

and control it. where you concerned about the change in strategy? yes. and control it. where you concerned about the change in strategy? yes, i didn't see it — about the change in strategy? yes, i didn't see it at _ about the change in strategy? yes, i didn't see it at the _ about the change in strategy? yes, i didn't see it at the time _ about the change in strategy? yes, i didn't see it at the time as _ about the change in strategy? yes, i didn't see it at the time as a - didn't see it at the time as a switch as we have heard from plan a to plan b. that sage had essentially said a week or so before, i think, that certain measures, those taken on the 16th of march, would be necessary. their own data coming up through the formal system said in that first week of march that the deceased was widespread and exhilarating faster than they believed and through that process there was a decision. what i understood to be the case was, apologies if i can't remember the words you use, but essentially an exhilaration, an intensification of the measures to stamp down harder on

the measures to stamp down harder on the progression of the deceased to keep serious incidents within the nhs's keep serious incidents within the nhs�*s capacity to cope. in parallel, the team in number ten reach the same conclusion and essentially took the prime minister through to that but the following decisions were taken on the basis of the sage evidence and in the uk cobra of the 15th of march. but evidence and in the uk cobra of the 15th of march.— 15th of march. but there was a chan . e, 15th of march. but there was a change, whatever? _ 15th of march. but there was a change, whatever? an - 15th of march. but there was a - change, whatever? an understanding that herd immunity, a necessary part of a mitigation strategy, could not, would not work because it failed to apply the degree of control. br; would not work because it failed to apply the degree of control. by that sta . e, apply the degree of control. by that stage. clearly. _ apply the degree of control. by that stage, clearly, because _ apply the degree of control. by that stage, clearly, because her- apply the degree of control. by that| stage, clearly, because her decease was so much more widespread through the population, the question alternative approaches, whether suppression and control that we talked about a segmentation approach were no longer practical, even if they had been, so that was her only option available. so they had been, so that was her only option available.— option available. so there was a chance? option available. so there was a change? there _ option available. so there was a change? there was _ option available. so there was a change? there was a _ option available. so there was a

change? there was a change. . option available. so there was al change? there was a change. as option available. so there was a l change? there was a change. as i sa , i change? there was a change. as i say, i understood _ change? there was a change. as i say, i understood it _ change? there was a change. as i say, i understood it at _ change? there was a change. as i say, i understood it at the - change? there was a change. as i say, i understood it at the time i change? there was a change. as i j say, i understood it at the time as an acceleration, an intensification of the measures sat sage had already alerted us would be necessary rather than a switch from plan a to plan b, but yes, there was of course a change but it is whether it was a complete change or exhilaration etc. was it in the context of that change that you made your reference to chickenpox parties, which out of fairness, i must ask you about because you have had evidence about it. it is important you have the opportunity of saying whatever you want to say about the context in which that remark was made. that remark was _ which that remark was made. that remark was made _ which that remark was made. trust remark was made before the meetings of the 13th to the 16th of march and the change of approach, and i should say at no point did i believe that coronavirus was only of the same

seriousness of chickenpox, i knew it was much more serious. that was not the point i was trying to make. as soon as i realised i think from bend won a's reaction that that is what he thought i was suggesting i dropped it because i realise the analogy was causing confusion. imore analogy was causing confusion. were ou seekin: analogy was causing confusion. were you seeking to _ analogy was causing confusion. were you seeking to make _ analogy was causing confusion. were you seeking to make a _ analogy was causing confusion. were you seeking to make a different point? where people to be allowed to become infected with chickenpox, they would therefore allow themselves to become vulnerable to buy less, and in the context of coronavirus, if their policy being pursued as one of herd immunity, whereby putting aside those people who were necessarily shielded or segmented, the remainder of the population would necessarily be infected? that that was something of a recognition of the reality of that? ., , ., ., .,

that? that is fair. i have tried to address the _ that? that is fair. i have tried to address the situation, _ that? that is fair. i have tried to address the situation, the - that? that is fair. i have tried to - address the situation, the judgment that it was inevitable that the virus would spread to the population what i was trying to examine was there a way of managing that, giving its highly differential impact that ensured that it spread through those for whom the disease was likely to be unpleasant or dangerous at, and that we could quarantine and shield people. if i may, there is a point i mightjust make to their families. these were private exchanges and i certainly had not expected this to become public, and i understand how, and in particular interpretation that has been put on it, that it must have come across that someone in my bill was hatless about this —— heartless about this. but i understand the stress it is caused

and i apologise for that because it was not my intention and i did not make it public. you was not my intention and i did not make it public.— make it public. you are watching live coverage — make it public. you are watching live coverage from _ make it public. you are watching live coverage from the _ make it public. you are watching live coverage from the covid - make it public. you are watching i live coverage from the covid inquiry in london. let's take goodbye to our viewersjoining us on bbc two in london. let's take goodbye to our viewers joining us on bbc two and in london. let's take goodbye to our viewersjoining us on bbc two and a reminder the coverage continues on the news channel as well as a bbc app the news channel as well as a bbc app and website. in which they debate and appear to agree that the cabinet office and you personally bear off the pace stop the context in which those e—mails arise is plainly a debate about whether or not you personally had understood the seriousness of the crisis. so against a context, against a background that there was an exhilaration of understanding or a change in strategy, however you put it, might it have been the position lord sedwill that you were slower to

appreciate their seriousness, the terrible predicament that the country was in than some others in downing street and the cabinet office? it downing street and the cabinet office? , , , downing street and the cabinet office? , office? it is possible. it is also ossible office? it is possible. it is also possible that _ office? it is possible. it is also possible that i _ office? it is possible. it is also possible that i bought - office? it is possible. it is also possible that i bought have, i office? it is possible. it is also i possible that i bought have, might have created that impression. i think that whatsapps you refer to him after a telephone call i had with the prime minister over that weekend and after he had a session which i hadn't attended with his his inner circle which they had discussed this, which they called from plan a to plan b. i hadn't caught up with that because i wasn't aware of it. so i guess that might have been behind some of that. but i think there is another point worth noting about how i saw my role, particularly at that time. i felt i had to provide leadership to a system that was on the edge of panic at that point and i didn't have the

luxury of even in private saying, we are doing, the system is broken, everyone is useless, because even if i'd said that in private, it would have spread across a system and risk causing panic. so what i saw myjob as was to provide to stay calm, notwithstanding my own excited, but to stay calm and to project confidence, not overconfidence, but confidence, not overconfidence, but confidence in the people who were working their way through this, that we would find a way through. because i was very conscious that even the most resilient people would be facing pressure at home and pressure at work and if those two things come together, even the most resilient people can struggle and i needed to try and lead those people through this extraordinary and terrifying moment. i can understand therefore to some who were not taken that approach it might have seemed i was

off. in approach it might have seemed i was off. . , approach it might have seemed i was off. ., , , ., approach it might have seemed i was off. ., , off. in any event, it is a poor reflection — off. in any event, it is a poor reflection of _ off. in any event, it is a poor reflection of the _ off. in any event, it is a poor reflection of the heart i off. in any event, it is a poor reflection of the heart of i reflection of the heart of government that the prime minister and his chief adviser should have made such claims at all against the cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. _ cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. i— cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. i am _ cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. i am not - cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. i am not sure i cabinet secretary. the government's cabinet secretary. i am not sure it i cabinet secretary. i am not sure it is a poor reflection on the resilience are just a reflection of the stress that those key players were under. the stress that those key players were under-— the stress that those key players were under. ., ., ., ., ., were under. you would have to ask them. were under. you would have to ask them- does — were under. you would have to ask them. does what _ were under. you would have to ask them. does what you _ were under. you would have to ask them. does what you have - were under. you would have to ask them. does what you have said i were under. you would have to ask. them. does what you have said about them. does what you have said about the fact that you wanted to try to lead and perhaps reduce the level of tension and pressure and try to keep a grip on the system, does at all explain why sir patrick vallance has said repeatedly in his diaries that a meeting which we assess must have

been one of the meetings on sunday the 15th of march, that you, furious, alternatively gave him are very similar, alternatively gave him an evil eye when sir patrick vallance advocated strongly the change in strategy, or as you would say, the exhilaration? i change in strategy, or as you would say, the exhilaration?— say, the exhilaration? i certainly don't remember _ say, the exhilaration? i certainly don't remember being _ say, the exhilaration? i certainly don't remember being furious i say, the exhilaration? i certainly. don't remember being furious and say, the exhilaration? i certainly i don't remember being furious and i can't speakfor... don't remember being furious and i can't speak for... he didn't tell me at the time that i pulled a face so i can't really speak for that. i'm a diplomat so we try to maintain some control over our facial expressions. and i wasn't furious. i probably did feel... i was worried about confusion. we had essentially two things coming together on that sunday, as we touched on, first, this sense from the prime minister's

own team, you heard from ben bonner, that the disease was moving faster and was more widespread than we had believed. and they took the prime minister threw that in private in the normal way and talked about a complete change in strategy. and then the formal process, the stage process through the chief scientific adviser was talking about bringing forward measures that they already said would be needed in a matter of weeks. i guess i was worried that we went into their formal meetings that went into their formal meetings that we needed to impose some order on that and so if it looked disorderly, i give her might well have pulled a face. ~ . , i give her might well have pulled a face. ~ ., , ., , ., face. might it have been that you were unimpressed _ face. might it have been that you were unimpressed by _ face. might it have been that you were unimpressed by the - face. might it have been that you were unimpressed by the clear. face. might it have been that you i were unimpressed by the clear attack on the strategy, the herd immunity strategy, to which you yourself were personally, as we've seen from the

e—mail? personally, as we've seen from the e-mail? ~ ., , �* e-mail? where did? i wasn't wedded to it. i realise _ e-mail? where did? iwasn't wedded to it. i realise by— e-mail? where did? i wasn't wedded to it. i realise by then _ e-mail? where did? i wasn't wedded to it. i realise by then there - e-mail? where did? i wasn't wedded to it. i realise by then there was i to it. i realise by then there was no alternative. i was reluctant. by the way, it is really important that you asked about red team. i don't know if you want to pursue that, but it's really important that policy is challenging that alternatives are considered, whether the suppression approach or the segmentation approach or the segmentation approach i was talking about. but it is clear by that weekend that none of those other options for the friable. we didn't have the capabilities in place that would be necessary to even make them viable, shielding programme critical to those alternatives, let alone the test and trace programme. therefore i was quite clear that the government had no choice but to accelerate into these measures on the job of the cabinet secretary is

to advise and then to step back and let them take decisions. i have been around government, i was in government a long time. governments do not always take decisions that i might have taken if i were in their shoes. but on this occasion they did. g; shoes. but on this occasion they did. ;: ., shoes. but on this occasion they did. g; ., . ., did. on the 23rd of march that national measures _ did. on the 23rd of march that national measures were i did. on the 23rd of march that i national measures were announced. did. on the 23rd of march that - national measures were announced. i am not going to ask you about the to that. it is clear from the evidence that. it is clear from the evidence that over the weekend of the 21st on 22nd of march became apparent the compliance was not what it should be, the measures were proving to be inadequate to stem the spread of the virus. but i want to ask you instead about the process, giving cuba cabinet secretary, by which the decision to impose that lockdown if we make use that word was made. on

the sunday the 22nd of march there were two strategy meetings in number ten, a meeting at three o'clock on shielding, there was then a meeting at 6:15pm on strategy and covid bill debate and another meeting, a post covid strategy meeting. evidence has been received by the inquiry to the effect that in practice the debate which took place on that sunday culminated in a decision on a recognition that the current measures were inadequate and the full lockdown had to be imposed. it is clear from the chronology that on the monday prime minister set aside preparation time to address the nation in the evening and of course he did address the nation. it is

therefore apparent that the decision to impose full lockdown for which he would be required to address the nation had been taken before that prep time, at 11105. but the cobra meeting did not take place until five o'clock, after he had prepared his evening address, and the cabinet meeting which you yourself confirmed this ultimate decision—making body in her majesty plasma government, did not take place until 1030 the following day. in terms of the constitutional propriety of that course, it does appear as if the practical decision to impose a lockdown was effectively taken and resolved on that sunday and it was therefore not a decision which was taken by cobra or cabinet. they've merely served to endorse a decision

which had already been taken. i think that is largely correct. i presume that parallel processes were happening in edinburgh, cardiff and belfast. there was a little communication between them so the cobra was, if i recall correctly, a uk wide cobra in which all of that was discussed and as you said, the practical decision was taken in a meeting earlier that day and that was appropriate, it was a cabinet committee. it had collective responsible to write and the ministers attending. it wouldn't have been practical, given the pace required by that point to intensify the measures, to try to convene all of the formal structures but i was comfortable at the time it was consumed usually proper and ——

constitutionally proper. d0 consumed usually proper and -- constitutionally proper.- constitutionally proper. do you acce -t constitutionally proper. do you accept that _ constitutionally proper. do you accept that the _ constitutionally proper. do you accept that the government i constitutionally proper. do you i accept that the government should have appreciated sooner than it did that the nhs would be overwhelmed, which of course was the trigger for the decision to impose a national lockdown and the measures a week before? i lockdown and the measures a week before? ~' ., lockdown and the measures a week before? ~ ., ., before? i think i would go further, in almost all _ before? i think i would go further, in almost all of _ before? i think i would go further, in almost all of these _ before? i think i would go further, in almost all of these cases i before? i think i would go further, in almost all of these cases we i in almost all of these cases we should have realised earlier. had the risk to _ should have realised earlier. had the risk to the _ should have realised earlier. had the risk to the nhs been appreciated sooner, it would have been open to the government, would it, to introduce a measure is that it did introduce a measure is that it did introduce in the 16th of march at an earlier stage, when the incident of virus was lower?— earlier stage, when the incident of virus was lower? correct? yes, that wasn't the — virus was lower? correct? yes, that wasn't the scientific _ virus was lower? correct? yes, that wasn't the scientific advice, - virus was lower? correct? yes, that wasn't the scientific advice, of i wasn't the scientific advice, of course, but you are right, the government could have done so. find

government could have done so. and had it done so, although we will never know, and therefore must remain their possibility those measures if introduced earlier would have avoided the need for the national lockdown. it is possible, but i national lockdown. it is possible, but i think— national lockdown. it is possible, but i think what _ national lockdown. it is possible, but | think what | _ national lockdown. it is possible, but i think what i recommend i national lockdown. it is possible, i but i think what i recommend there is we really should ask... i don't know if the inquiry is intending to do so, but we would need really deep academic research to make those judgments around the counterfactual. i think it is reasonable at the supposition, i have read other witness statements. i don't know... i am highly sceptical it would have been possible to avoid a lockdown altogether but it might have been possible to have a less prolonged lockdown and what we don't know if the effect on the overall number of deaths but my presumption having read other witness statements, it is not something i everfelt read other witness statements, it is not something i ever felt qualified tojudge independently, is at earlier would have been better. we're not looking for your

epidemiological answer. the question presumes that there will only ever be their possibility and that it can be their possibility and that it can be never known but as a cabinet secretary at that time, as a person intimately involved in these momentous decisions, how could you not have a view as to whether or not if those earlier steps had been taken earlier, a different course might have been open to the government? this might have been open to the government?— might have been open to the rovernment? ~ , �* ., government? as i've said, i agree, i have looked — government? as i've said, i agree, i have looked at _ government? as i've said, i agree, i have looked at the _ government? as i've said, i agree, i have looked at the other _ government? as i've said, i agree, i l have looked at the other statements. all trying to do is suggest... i don't want to try and impose a judgment now is not an expert on the decisions we took at the time. the decisions we took at the time. the decision said the government took at the time were based on the scientific advice they were getting. clearly, and we have heard this from people more expert than i, had those decisions been taken earlier then, particularly given we didn't know

how fast the disease was moving, it would have had a greater impact on that exhilarating curve earlier and one presumes a positive effect on lockdown casualties, etc. if we could have avoided a lockdown, i am much more sceptical about that. i think it is more likely to have been about its duration. it is think it is more likely to have been about its duration.— about its duration. it is obvious from the chronology _ about its duration. it is obvious from the chronology that i about its duration. it is obvious from the chronology that the i from the chronology that the ultimate decision was taken on that sunday and endorsed on the monday. and tuesday. want to became clear that the measures of the 16th of march were proven to be inadequate. what debate was there on that sunday, the weekend of the 21st on 22nd of march and on the monday as to how much time should be given further to see what behaviour

changes might occur in the population at large so as to reduce the need for a mandatory stay—at—home order, to obviate the need for the ultimate sanction? i don't recall much debate at all but there may be documents that correct that regulation. my recollection is that, i think i refer to it in might witness statement, is that when the 16th of march measures were taken, there was an explicit recognition that they would need to be assessed and i think we were born that would take some time, 21 days, i think we were told at the time, but i might not be correct about that. what was the advice... it was very clear, as i recall, from the chief medical officer by the end of that week that we needed to go further. it wasn't just compliance, we were just looking at compliance. the evidence of that was a practical as well as

data. actually, they could just see the numbers were not changing as fast as they would wish and are was not dropping below one. he essentially said it isn't working, we need to go further. the measures weren't working. _ we need to go further. the measures weren't working. that _ we need to go further. the measures weren't working. that is _ we need to go further. the measures weren't working. that is clear. i we need to go further. the measures weren't working. that is clear. that l weren't working. that is clear. that weekend there were press reporter people parks and large numbers of people parks and large numbers of people spending the weekend in public. to what extent was it understood that the population had already taken upon itself to change its behaviour? it was clear that groups of the population cohorts of the population were changing their behaviour and others weren't. in a different

approach, the advisory targeted approach, the advisory targeted approach that we have discussed already that i was early on keen to explore, that might have been 0k. explore, that might have been ok. but by that stage, given how widespread the disease had become, it was clear that that essentially voluntary approach where people made their own judgment wasn't adequate and the lockdown had to be imposed. the only difference between a voluntary restriction and the mandatory one is the force of law implied to the latter. if the population was changing its behaviour, then those social restrictions would be taking effect and would be applicable by virtue of that behavioural change. why did no one say, or perhaps they did, let's wait three orfour one say, or perhaps they did, let's wait three or four more days, perhaps get closer to the 21 day expiry period from the 16th of march and see whether or not those behavioural changes will gather pace

and develop and therefore